Title: Social Algorithms and Internet Economics Speaker: Dr. Swaparva Nath, ISI Delhi Time and Date: 2:30 pm, Monday 21/04/2014 Venue: Room 217, Mechanical Engineering Abstract: Classical algorithm design assumes that all the parameters of the objective function is known. When that information is held privately by multiple agents, we arrive in the domain of mechanism design, where the parameters of a social objective function is dispersed among the strategic agents who reveal this information when an algorithm can be designed to incentivize them to do so. In the first part of the talk, I will motivate the design of algorithm under incomplete information and then in the particular setting of crowdsourcing, we will investigate what are the limits of achievability and propose algorithms that approximates the social objective. The work that I am going to present is part of my PhD thesis, and I will mention a brief sketch of the other crowdsourcing problems addressed in my thesis. Speaker Bio: Swaprava is a Post-doctoral Fellow at the Economics and Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi. He did his PhD at the Dept. of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. His current research interest is in the Game Theoretic questions arising in the areas of Internet Economics, Outsourcing, Crowdsourcing, Machine Learning etc. Swaprava's work encompasses different areas of strategic task outsourcing. He has completed internships at Xerox Research Centre, Europe (XRCE), in 2010, where he had worked on Incentive Compatible Learning for E-Services, and in EconCS, Harvard University, in 2011, where he has worked with Prof. David C. Parkes, and worked on Economics of Opensource Networks. He is a recipient of the Honorable Mention Award of Yahoo! Key Scientific Challenges Program, 2012. His PhD research was supported by the Tata Consultancy Services PhD Fellowship, 2010.
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