IEOR seminar by Saish Nevrekar, IGIDR, Mumbai
Speaker: Saish Nevrekar, IGIDR, Mumbai
Title: Endogenous Coalition Formation in Contests
Venue: IEOR Seminar room
Time and date: 11:30 am on 1st October (Monday)
Abstract: This paper analyses the problem of endogenous coalition formation in contests. Players in our model form coalitions based on the non-cooperative approach developed by Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1997). In this approach players sequentially engage in a negotiation process before a coalition is formed, but once agreed upon, the coalitions are contractually binding. The main contribution of this paper is deriving sharper results, compared to Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1997), under additional assumptions relevant to contests. In a model with identical players, we specify a contest success function for the context of group contests to show that the coalition structure formed at equilibrium is unique and asymmetric. Further, we impose additional restrictions on the contest success function to determine the number of coalitions formed at equilibrium and the probability distribution (of winning the contest) across those coalitions.
Bio: Saish Nevrekar is a PhD scholar at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development and Research (IGIDR), under the supervision of Prof. P. G. Babu, with a research interest primarily in applied game theory and its applications to problems in industrial organisation related to competition policy. His current research papers cover the topics of the theory of coalition formation, contest theory, mergers and acquisitions, and environmental economics. He is also interested in a new research direction that integrates the field of ethics, behavioral economics and mechanism design.