Preconference Tutorial: Design of Markets and Service Systems with Strategic Agents
Krishnamurthy Iyer
Operations Research and Information Engineering (ORIE), Cornell University
The last two decades have seen the rise of a number of online markets
and service systems, ranging from auction markets for online
advertising to platform markets for peer-to-peer transportation,
freelance labor and shared housing. In such systems, the agents'
behavior is often the result of the incentive structure induced by the
design of the system. Consequently, quantifying how participants act
is an important step in the analysis of the system performance and in
the evaluation of different system designs.
Game theory provides a standard set of tools to analyze the outcome of
an interaction among a group of agents. In this tutorial, we will
briefly introduce the basic game theoretic concepts, and study their
applications in the design and analysis of markets and service
systems. Specifically, we will focus on stochastic/queueing models
and study the impact of various controls: pricing, scheduling and
information sharing.
Topics
This tutorial will be delivered in two sessions, each 1.5 hours long.
- Background
- Games of incomplete information
- Bayesian Nash equilibrium
- Applications to first price/second price auctions
- Basics of Mechanism Design
- Revelation principle
- Myerson optimal auction
- Applications in OR/OM
- Stochastic/queueing models for service systems
- Pricing/Scheduling policies in queueing systems
- Information design in queueing systems